Social Choice Theory: An Introduction
Springer Science & Business Media, 9 mrt. 2013 - 165 pagina's
This is a textbook introducing selected topics in formal social choice theory. Social choice theory studies group choices that are based on information about preferences of members of the group (voting rules being one important special case). This involves economics, which provides the method of modelling individual decision making; political philosophy, which provides criteria about the allocation of decision-influencing power; and game theory, which provides a framework for thinking about the strategies individuals employ in trying to influence the group choice. The goal of this book is to take basic ideas like impossibility theorems, rights exercising and strategy proofness and give the student just enough technical background to be able to understand these ideas in a logically rigorous way. This is done through a set of 250 exercises that constitute the heart of the book and which differentiate this book from all other texts in social choice theory.
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Simple Majority Voting
The Voting Paradox
Other Voting Extensions
Social Choice Rules
Arrows Impossibility Theorem
Answers and Hints to Selected Exercises
Overige edities - Alles weergeven
agenda Allan Gibbard approval voting Arrow's theorem assigned beats Borda count Chapter choice function choice rule satisfying chosen coalition column five column six Condorcet winner Consider contagion result Cu(v Cu(x defeats defined diagram Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem i-variants implies indifferent integer least number of individuals ordered pairs outcome Pareto-superior permutations positive responsiveness preference ordering range constraint row four row three rule is manipulable rule of Example Sen's Show simple majority voting sincere submissions single-peaked preferences social choice rule social choice theory standard domain constraint strategy-proof by counterthreats strictly prefers strong orders strong Pareto condition subset Suppose theorem three alternatives three individuals transitive explanations voting paradox X X X X X X yxz X X y y Z Z xyz X X X X X X xyz:X xyzw Xzy:X yzX:X yzX:X yZX:y Z X y X Z Z Figure Z Z y Z X Z X Zxy:X ZyX:X