than Western Europe. I therefore think it not beyond the limits of a sober forecast to conjecture that some further integration may take place in the West European states; and if it should take place, it seems probable that the example of America will be followed, and that the new political aggregate will be formed on the basis of a federal polity. When we turn our gaze from the past to the future, an extension of federalism seems to me the most probable of the political prophecies relative to the form of government." In fact, Europe has added little to the science of government during the past century excepting the English system of self-governing dependencies, and even that follows and is developing into the American federal system.

In other words, this division of sovereign powers between a central government and the states is an American institution. The indivisible sovereignty has been demonstrated to be divisible. The impossible has been shown to be possible.

(5) A Supreme Court with Power to Declare Statutes Void. The most striking and original American achievement was the establishment of the supremacy of the judiciary. Nowhere else in all history had this experiment in government been tried. Lord Brougham said of it, "The power of the Judiciary to prevent either the State Legislatures or Congress from overstepping the limits of the Constitution, is the very greatest refinement in social policy to which any state of circumstances has ever given rise, or to which any age has ever given birth."2 That is why the Supreme Court of the United States is the greatest court that ever existed. Judge Rogers points out that this part of the Constitution is purely American and without precedent in history. He says, "There was no precedent in ancient or modern judicial history, before these cases were decided, which warranted a court in asserting such a principle, and it was difficult for men trained under the English system of jurisprudence to conceive the idea that a mere court should assume the preroga

tive of setting aside a law enacted by the legislature and approved by the executive." 1 Martin Van Buren said, "There exists not upon this earth, and there never did exist, a judicial tribunal clothed with powers so various and so important" as the Supreme Court. Professor Burgess of Columbia University, after reviewing all governments, ancient and modern, demonstrates that the rights of man were and are protected against government usurpation for the first time by the Supreme Court of the United States.

The Supreme Court, supreme in its intelligence, fearlessness, and impartiality, adjudicates subjects of the highest human interest and its power extends throughout the United States and from the Philippines to Porto Rico. It summons imperial States to its bar and it says to Congress and the Executive, "Thus far shalt thou go and no farther." It listens patiently to high and low, and its decisions, conscientiously considered and learnedly expressed, have the absolute confidence of the people. It is the guardian of the rights and liberties of the people. Pinkney well said of that court, "Its position is upon the outer wall. It forms the point at which our different systems of government meet in collision, when collision unhappily exists. They [the judges] are, if I may so call them, the great arbitrators between contending sovereignties."2 That was said about a hundred years ago and is even more true now than then. Never before has a court been called upon to reconcile a division of sovereign powers; never before has a court had power to annul the statutes of forty-eight sovereign states and of a federal government. De Sumichrast, a recent English writer on America, says: "It is becoming plain that the deep Anglo-Saxon faith in the utility and reliability of the courts of justice as a preferable means of staying and destroying oppression, is part and parcel of the belief of the Nation. The courts are justifying the confidence reposed in them. They do so because, in part, public opinion is ranging itself on their side. . The tendency,

growing happily stronger, is to have recourse to the courts rather than to additional legislation; to trust them, rather than the blind impulses of the mob. In a word, all omens, all signs point to the permanent establishment of the true reign of true justice in the country." Calvin Coolidge, when Vice President, expressed the sentiments of the American people when he said of our Supreme Court: "It is that court which has stood as the guardian and protector of our form of government, the guarantee of the perpetuity of the Constitution, and above all the great champion of the freedom and the liberty of the people. No other known tribunal has ever been devised in which the people could put their faith and confidence, to which they could intrust their choicest treasure, with a like assurance that there it would be secure and safe. There is no power, no influence, great enough to sway its judgments. There is no petitioner humble enough to be denied the full protection of its great authority."

The Supreme Court is the most unique of all American institutions. Never before have such powers been granted to a judicial tribunal. It is distinctively American. It has rendered a great republic possible. It is America's greatest contribution to civilization. While America lasts that court will last.

(6) Separation of the Executive from the Legislative Branch of the Government. There never was in history such a complete independence of the legislative and executive branches of government and such complete separation of them, each with equal coördinate powers even as to constitutional questions, as were originated by and embodied in the American constitution. In fact, in 1776 the legislative branch had been submerged all over Europe. The King ruled and the legislative department, even where it existed, was but the tool of the King, the executive, in France, Prussia, Spain, Italy, Russia, and even England. And the American plan of clean-cut separation and independent existence of Congress and the President has been wonderfully suc

cessful. It is an American institution. In England there never has been and is not now any such separation and independence. From early times in England the King more or less dominated the advisory or legislative branch, until gradually and almost imperceptibly the House of Commons usurped the executive power. This was possible because the King was dependent on the House of Commons to vote annual taxes, and without taxes he could not exist. Hence when the King did things which the Commons did not like, the Commons cut off the supplies and the King had to surrender. Charles I refused to surrender and for many years did not even have a session of Parliament; so they cut off his head. James II, his son, behaved so badly they drove him out. Gradually the "Cabinet" system arose, namely, the Executive Department became, not the King, but individuals chosen from the Commons and House of Lords, and if this Cabinet did things which the Commons did not like, the Cabinet had to resign and a new Cabinet was formed; without the election of a new Parliament if the new Cabinet could control a majority of the Commons, and with an election if the new Cabinet could not command such control. Either this or no taxes and supplies. Meantime the King did not become merely a drum major without a desperate struggle. After the experiences of Charles I and James II the King fell back on bribery of the Commons and of the electorate, and also of the nobles who controlled the "rotten boroughs"; the bribe to the nobles being titles or offices; the bribe to the Commons being titles or money or offices; the bribe to the electorate being cash. By these means, especially under Walpole as Premier in the beginning of the eighteenth century, and under George III, the King retained a great influence; so much so that George III really controlled the Commons and the Cabinet. Later this unity of control of executive and legislative departments swung in the opposite direction until now the Commons control and have practically absorbed the executive department of the English government.

The Americans in framing their Constitution of 1787 wanted none of this. They were afraid of any combination of the legislative and executive departments as dangerous to liberty and the continuance of the Constitution itself. Hence they separated those two departments by most decisive provisions. The President was elected in one way and served for a definite period four years. Congress was elected in a different way and for a definite period - two years for the House and six years for the Senate. If Congress differs from the President (as it generally does), the differences are compromised or allowed to stand. No new election takes place by reason thereof, and the American people in fact are quite content that they should differ because thereby much legislation is avoided. Now the English system of electing a new Parliament whenever irreconcilable differences arise works very well in a compact and homogeneous country like England or in an agricultural country like Canada, but works badly in France by reason of the instability and rapid changes preventing continuity of policy, and would work still worse in the United States. "Whatever," says Bryce, "may be the merits of the British system for a nation which inhabits a comparatively small area, few will think that this system would suit a people more than twice as numerous, and occupying a territory more than fifty times as large."

Hence the American system is emphatically an American institution and the Americans are content with it. If this country, with its vast extent, diverse interests, and 48 states, were liable to be faced at any time with upheaval of business, regular occupations, and regular life by the sudden election of a new Congress, the result would be serious. As it is, the country breathes a sigh of relief when Congress adjourns. America has no wish to have a Congressional election except at a fixed time when the disturbance is expected and provided for. More important still, the English system would give Congress the power practically to name and change the executive department, excepting the Presi