σαφηνείας ἕνεκεν. versy that have existed in this department are owing to that unwillingness to innovate in matters of language, which leads to the employment of the same term in various shades of meaning, and with reference to various phenomena of consciousness. In this respect philosophy is under deep obligations to the purism of German writers, which has enabled subsequent thinkers to examine the most important problems of Psychology apart from the old associations of language. A new phraseology may occasion some little difficulty at the outset of a work; but to adhere to an inadequate vocabulary merely because its expressions are established, is to involve the whole of the subject in hopeless confusion and obscurity. In this respect, however, I trust I shall not be found to have departed from authorized language in a greater degree than is absolutely necessary for the purpose of communicating to English readers some of the most valuable results of German thought, and of carrying into effect the main design of the present Essay, — that of testing the received processes of Logic, by reference to the facts of human consciousness.

Nine-tenths of the confusion and contro

ON LAW, AS RELATED TO THOUGHT AND OTHER OBJECTS, 76

PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.

CHAPTER I.

ON THOUGHT, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER FACTS OF

CONSCIOUSNESS.

WITHOUT entering into the countless disputes which have taken place concerning the nature and definition of Logic, it is sufficient to observe that it will be treated in the following pages, in accordance principally with the views of Kant, as the Science of the Laws of Formal Thinking. In the wide sense, indeed, in which the term is used by Archbishop Whately, it may be admitted that Logic, as furnishing rules to secure the mind from error in its deductions, is also an Art, or, to speak more correctly, a Practical Science. Still, it may be questioned whether the practical service thus performed by Logic can with propriety be allowed to influence its definition. The

1 For a summary of various opinions on this question, see Zabarella, de Natura Logica, lib. i.; Smiglecii Logica, Disp. ii. Qu. v.; Burgersdicii Inst. Log. lib. i. cap. 1, and Sir W. Hamilton, Edinburgh Review, No. 115, p. 203. 2 For the distinction between these terms, see Wolf, Phil. Rat. Proleg., § 10. "Omnis Logica utens est habitus, qui proprio exercitio comparatur, minime autem discendo acquiritur, adeoque et ipsa doceri nequit. Quamobrem, cum Logica omnis vel sit docens vel utens, neque enim præter regularum notitiam atque habitum eas ad praxin transferendi tertium

benefits performed by Logic as a medicine of the mind, however highly we may be disposed to rate them, are accidental only, and arise from causes external to the Science itself: its speculative character, as an inquiry into the laws of thought, is internal and essential.

twofold character of Logic two conditions are necessary. Firstly, that there exist certain mental laws to which every sound thinker is bound to conform. Secondly, that it is possible to transgress those laws, or to think unsoundly. On the former of these conditions depends the possibility of Logic as a speculative Science; on the latter, its possibility as a practical Science or Art. Now, if we look at these two conditions with reference to the actual contents of pure Logic, it is manifest that the abrogation of the first would utterly annihilate the whole Science; whereas the abrogation of the second would at most only necessitate the removal of a few excrescences, leaving the main body of Logical doctrine substantially as it is at present. Suppose, for example, that the difference between sound and unsound reasoning could be discerned in individual cases as a matter of fact, but that we had no power of classifying the several instances of each and referring them to certain common principles. It is clear that, under such a supposition, the present contents of Logic, speculative and practical, could have no existence. The number of sound and unsound thinkers in the world might remain much as it is now, but the impossibility of investigating the principles of the one and applying them to the correction of the other would make an Art or Science of Logic unattainable.

concipi potest; sola Logica artificialis docens ea est, quæ doceri adeoque in numerum disciplinarum philosophicarum referri potest. Atque ideo quoque Logicam definivimus per scientiam, minime autem per artem vel habitum in genere, quod genus convenit Logicæ utenti.”