interest to be paid on these additional sums was actually greater than the amount of interest saved by the purchase of stock, besides the expense of maintaining the office of the commissioners.

A return was published in 1822, showing the amount of loans contracted in each year from 1793 to 1816, and the sum paid during that period to the commissioners of the sinking fund. It appears from that return, that within that period the amount of loans contracted was 584,874,586,1717., upon which there became due in dividends and annuities 30,174,364%. But of this sum only 396,352,2067., bearing 21,006,131l. interest, was required to defray the war expenditure, and 188,522,3497., yielding the sum of 9,168,2327. a year, was transferred to the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund. After a lengthened period of illusion and extravagance, the folly of such financial measures was clearly exposed. In 1819 it was attempted to maintain a sinking fund out of a fixed surplus of 5,000,000l. a year. But in 1829 the principle was definitively adopted to devote to the reduction of the national debt such an annual sum as should appear to be the actual surplus revenue of the United Kingdom beyond the actual annual expenditure; and under that system a sum of about 50,000,000l. has been cancelled of the public stock during the forty years of peace.

Some well-digested suggestions for the payment of the national debt have been made in the Twelfth Annual Report of the Registrar-general for Births, Deaths, and Marriages for the year 1849, by the learned Dr. Farr. The method there suggested is as follows:-For a num

ber of years the annual charge on the public debt of the United Kingdom has been about 28,000,000l. By the expiration of annuities, the annual charge will in a few years be reduced to about 24,000,000l., leaving a surplus of 4,000,000l. a year. Supposing the annuity of 28,000,000l. a year to be kept up and devoted to pay the interest and to cancel stock, it is calculated that both the debt and the annual charge would disappear at the end of sixty-six years from the time the interest falls to 24,000,000l.

Of course any such plan presupposes, first, that the mind of the nation continues for so long a time bent upon redeeming its national obligations, and, secondly, that the circumstances of the nation will permit the laying aside of 28,000,000l. for the interest of the national debt, whether the whole sum be wanted for that purpose or not. The only method available for the reduction of the national debt is doubtless the devotion to such a purpose of any surplus from the revenues of the United Kingdom. It is true the experience of late years does not encourage the expectation of realizing any large surplus. Whilst, on the one hand, the critical state of politics in Europe and Asia renders any material diminution of our military and naval expenditure highly improbable, and, on the other, all other sources of expenditure are also on the increase, we have seen that, although the burden of taxation falls lightly upon the people, there is no possibility whatever of maintaining any tax except under the pressure of absolute necessity. Yet there is no royal road to the payment of so large a debt. The effects of waste, extravagance, and unavoid

able emergencies must be met by corresponding savings and sacrifices. The duty of the nation, meanwhile, is to have a fixed determination to make such sacrifices for that purpose as are compatible with public prosperity; to maintain our national finances in a state of perfect stability; to endeavour as much as possible to realize some annual surplus; and, above all, to avert as far as practicable the necessities for new loans. With the continuous progress of wealth, and with further improvements in the methods of taxation, the burdens of the national debt will be less and less felt; and it may be that, in process of time, we shall be able to undertake financial operations in relation to the national debt which it would be chimerical at present to prognosticate.

CA

BOOK IV.

CONTROL OF PUBLIC MONEY.

CHAPTER I.

RIGHT OF TAXATION.

HE right of taxation vests in the legislative power;

THE

and as such legislative power in the United Kingdom vests in Parliament, which is composed of the Queen, the House of Lords, and the House of Commons, neither of these has an exclusive right of taxation. We have already seen that by Magna Charta, or the Great Charter of liberties, the sovereign right of levying taxes was expressly limited. That remarkable document says, 'No scutage or aid shall be imposed in our kingdom unless by the general council of our kingdom, except for ransoming our person, making our eldest son a knight, and once for marrying our eldest daughter; and for these there shall be paid a reasonable aid.'

The same charter was afterwards confirmed by Edward I., who again declared as follows:-Moreover, we have granted for us and our heirs, as well to archbishops, bishops, abbots, priors, and other folk of Holy Church, as also to earls, barons, and to all the commonalty of the land, that for no business from thence

forth we shall take such manner of aids, tasks, nor prises, but by the common consent of all the realm and for the common profit thereof, saving the ancient aids. and prises due and accustomed.' Later still, the Bill of Rights declared 'That no man be compelled to make any gift, loan, or benevolence, or tax without common consent by act of Parliament.' And, finally, it was established, in the Act of Settlement of 1688, under William and Mary, 'That levying money for or to the use of the Crown by pretence and prerogative, without grant of Parliament, for longer time or in other manner than the same is or shall be granted, is illegal.'

These are the means whereby a complete parliamentary control was put on the levying of taxes in the United Kingdom.

Very early, however, in our constitutional history, a conflict was manifested between the Lords and Commons as to the right of originating bills for taxation. It was long before the constitutional rights of the three estates of the realm, and the mode and exact province of their respective actions were properly defined. Henry IV. proposed to consult the Lords first as to the amount of aid they conceived necessary for the public service, and then ask the consent of the Commons. The Commons, however, protested against such a procedure; and they claimed, as the representatives of the people, that all grants of aids should proceed first from them, and could not originate with the Lords. The King then suggested that the Lords and Commons should each commune among themselves, and should make