CHAPTER III.

CONTROL OF THE ISSUES.

ITHERTO we have described the steps taken to

HITE

provide for a sufficient control over the grant of money for the public expenditure. We shall now see the measures taken with respect to the issue of the money authorized to be expended. The power of issue is vested in an independent office-the Exchequer. The Exchequer is the great conservator of the revenues of the nation; it does not exercise any authority over the administrative departments of receipt, nor over the departments of payment, any further than to guard against the illegal appropriation of any portion of the public income. The constitutional functions of its officers, who hold their situations for life, are to provide for the safe keeping and proper appropriation of the public monies, which are vested in its name, and deposited in its care, until issued under the authority of Parliament for the services of the State; and it is armed with a power of denying its sanction to any demands upon it for the issue of public money, from whatever minister or department they may be made, unless those demands are found in accordance with the determination of the Legislature. These are the powers of

the Exchequer as described by the Royal Commissioners of 1831.

All the revenue received by the several collectors acting under the revenue departments is paid, in the first instance, to the account of the receivers-general of these departments: a transfer from those accounts to the general account of the Exchequer takes place daily at the Bank of England and Bank of Ireland, and advice of such transfers is sent to the Exchequer both by the revenue departments and by the banks. As soon as money is thus placed to the account of the Exchequer, the Comptroller assumes a complete command over the issue, and no payment is made except upon the authority of a Treasury or Royal warrant. cases of grant by Parliament charged on the Consolidated Fund the Comptroller requires the authority of a Treasury warrant; and in cases of supply services he requires the authority of a Royal order under the Royal sign-manual, countersigned by the Commissioners of the Treasury.

In

With the issue of such warrants, the Commissioners of the Treasury send a letter to the Comptroller of the Exchequer, requesting him to authorize the Bank to give a credit to the paying officer for the sum required, and upon the authority of such warrants the Comptroller of the Exchequer issues his warrant to the Bank to give credit to the person therein named. But there is another personage through whom all payments are made, and that is the Paymaster-General. All warrants are in duplicate-one goes to the Exchequer and the other to the Paymaster-General; and when the

Treasury sends a warrant to the Exchequer, the Exchequer issues the amount of that warrant to the Paymaster-General. But the Paymaster-General has no active duties. As soon as he comes into office he grants power of attorney to certain officers to act for him in supplying the accounts opened at the Bank of England in his name with funds, and in drawing upon those accounts for the payment of public services. He never interferes in the details of the business, and there is not any salary attached to the office, which is now held by one of the Vice-Presidents of the Board of Trade; though it is with the Paymaster-General that the great responsibility rests.

It will be seen, however, that, though the Exchequer issues the money for the purposes designed by the Appropriation Act, and upon the authority of the Treasury, it cannot control the actual payment of it for the purposes specified by the Paymaster-General. The issues from the Exchequer are transferred by the Paymaster to one common account, called the drawing account; but, when so transferred, the money is indiscriminately issued for any services required, whether with or without the authority of an Exchequer warrant. Nor is the Paymaster's drawing account supplied altogether from the Exchequer and with appropriated funds. The drawing account is supplied from the cash account, and this cash account consists of miscella neous receipts, many of which are free from any appropriation to the public service, and of public and private deposits, legally applicable only to the special purposes for which they are lodged. The deposits are often illegally

applied, and advanced for public purposes, and, when wanted, an adjustment is made by misapplying the Exchequer issues. This mixture of accounts, this misappropriation of grants, are clearly objectionable, and defeat altogether the purposes of the Legislature. It has been proposed to abolish the political office of the Paymaster-General, and to place all its duties under the control of the Treasury. This measure might simplify the present round-about process, but where will then be the parliamentary control of the issue? Whatever may be the confidence we may place in the Government, it is desirable to preserve those constitutional safeguards which have often proved of extreme value against abuses and mismanagement. To abandon the principle of appropriation of public grants would be most injurious; to leave the appropriation uncontrolled in the hands of the Treasury is unconstitutional, What should be done? The Exchequer control should be preserved with increased powers; the office of Paymaster-General should be reconstructed, with a view to parliamentary responsibility; and a finance committee should be appointed, at the commencement of every session, to examine the accounts of the Exchequer, and to report any misappropriation of the grants made in the previous year. These are safe and constitutional measures, which are urgently required, in order to ecure the proper appropriation of parliamentary grants.

A

CHAPTER IV.

FINANCIAL ACCOUNT S.

PERFECT system of accounts and an independent

audit are doubtless the best and the only guarantees for the faithful administration of public money. When we consider that all the financial measures of the session are founded on the calculations of the Chancellor of the Exchequer of the receipts of the past year, and the probable wants of the next, the sooner the financial accounts for the past year are presented, the more available they would become for the public service. But, in order to make these accounts agree with the financial year, and in order to prevent any expenditure of money without a previous vote of the House, the accounts are made up to the 31st of March, and are consequently presented late in the session. This produces a great inconvenience, as the information contained in them is withheld from Parliament and the public at the very time when it would be most useful. There is, moreover, much incongruity in the disagreement between the finance accounts and all commercial and navigation accounts, which are uniformly made up to the 31st December. If it be necessary that the financial year should continue from April to April, it is still better and more desirable that the accounts should