ushered in the rich, showy and nutrient fruits of the forest and the bread-yielding grains of the meadow and the marsh. The wonderful revolution wrought by this same growing soul in the relations of the sexes among the creatures last mentioned has also been dwelt upon1 and might fittingly form the theme of the future poetry of sciencex In human society, as I shall presently endeavor to show, the soul is the great transforming agent which has worked its way up through the stages of savagery and barbarism to civilization and enlightenment, the power behind the throne of reason in the evolution of man. 1 In later parts of the address last cited. Х CHAPTER IX. THE PHILOSOPHY OF DESIRE. The state which prompts the organism to seek any object whatever is properly, though to limited degrees of intensity, a state of pain. But the inclination to seek an object is desire, and thus desire is psychologically a painful state. Desire may, therefore, be called negative pain, being the disagreeable state experienced from a lack of the means of fulfilling a normal function, as distinguished from positive pain, which is the disagreeable state experienced from having been deprived of such means previously possessed. - Dynamic Sociology, II, 149. Cupiditas est ipsa hominis essentia, quatenus ex data quacunque ejus affectione determinata concipitur ad aliquid agendum. — SPINOZA: Ethica, Pars III. Affectuum Definitiones, I. Id unusquisque ex legibus suæ naturæ necessario appetit vel aversatur, quod bonum vel malum esse judicat. — SPINOZA: Ethica, Pars IV, Propositio XIX. La concupiscence et la force sont la source de toutes nos actions: la concupiscence fait les volontaires; la force les involontaires. — PASCAL : Pensées, I, p. 220. Desires are ideal feelings that arise when the real feelings to which they correspond have not been experienced for some time. - HERBERT SPENCER: Principles of Psychology, I, p. 126. There are pains arising from states of inaction-pains we call them, since we here use the word as antithetical to pleasures; but they are best known as discomforts or cravings, from having a quality in which they are like one another and unlike pains commonly so called. — Ibid., p. 273. When there come to be cases in which two very similar groups of external attributes and relations have been followed in experience by different motor changes; and when, consequently, the presentation of one of these groups partially excites two sets of motor changes, each of which is prevented by their mutual antagonism from at once taking place; then, while one of these sets of nascent motor changes and nascent impressions habitually accompanying it, constitutes a memory of such motor changes as before performed and impressions as before received, and while it also constitutes a prevision of the action appropriate to the new occasion, it further constitutes the desire to perform the action. — Ibid., p. 481. Alles Wollen entspringt aus Bedürfniss, also aus Mangel, also aus Leiden. Diesem macht die Erfüllung ein Ende. SCHOPENHAUER: Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, I, 230–231. Der Wunsch ist, seiner Natur nach, Schmerz: die Erreichung gebiert schnell Sättigung: das Ziel war nur scheinbar: der Besitz nimmt den Reiz weg unter einer neuen Gestalt stellt sich der Wunsch, das Bedürfniss wieder ein wo nicht, so folgt Oede, Leere, Langeweile, gegen welche der Kampf eben so quälend ist, wie gegen die Noth. — Ibid., 370. Jede Befriedigung nur ein hinweggenommener Schmerz, kein gebrachtes positives Glück ist. — Ibid., 443. Sed dum abest quod avemus, id exsuperare videtur Cetera; post aliut, cum contigit illud, avemus Et sitis aequa tenet vitai semper hiantis. LUCRETIUS: De Rerum Natura, III, 1082-1084. Nihil enim æque gratum est adeptis quam concupiscentibus. — PLINY THE YOUNGER: Epist. XV. It has been a thousand times observed, and I must observe it once more, that the hours we pass with happy prospects in view are more pleasing than those crowned with fruition. - GOLDSMITH: Vicar of Wakefield, I, 337. It was shown in Chap. VI that intensive sensations normally give rise to immediate movements towards the pleasure- | and from the pain-producing object. With the simpler or presentative sensations, feeling, taste, and smell, this is usually possible since the object is already present and in contact with the nerve. The hand shrinks from the hot iron; the mouth closes more and more upon the savory morsel or quaffs the pleasant beverage. But with sensations at all remote, that is, with those which are in any degree representative, the movement may be in whole or in part prevented. If, for example, the food or drink be merely seen at a greater or less distance, even if a movement toward it is immediately begun, time is required to reach it, and should obstacles intervene it may be brought to rest. So if danger be reported by sound or sight, and flight from it be impeded by confinement or chains, motion does not result. Nevertheless the sensation thus representatively produced exists and the state of consciousness endures for a longer or shorter period. This state of consciousness is a desire either to approach or to retreat. Representative sensations are necessarily derivative. The first organic being, though it were of a high type of structure, would be incapable of desire.Desire presupposes a psychic apparatus built up by the psychic process. Its essential prerequisite is the registration of impressions and the continuity of conscious states. In short, desire presupposes memory. A representative sensation is a remembered sensation, and desires are the recorded and remembered pains and pleasures of sentient beings. The simple presentative sensations, though common enough, are little noted and comparatively unimportant. The more complex representative ones are constantly arising and in the higher forms of life become the dominant states of consciousness, absorbing attention and making up the greater part of the life of all sentient beings. The examples given are among the simplest. The principal cases are those residing in the internal emotions. In man these latter assume supreme importance and overshadow all others. The entire being is a theater of multiplied desires seeking satisfaction through appropriate action, but checked in a thousand ways and encountering innumerable obstacles. There results a perpetual striving to attain the objects of desire The full significance of the conative faculty cannot be comprehended until this truth is clearly grasped. It is the principle of effort or exertion (conari, to endeavor) constantly in active operation, leading to all forms of action. It is this too that rounds out the conception of the soul, and without which it possesses little meaning.X I use the word desire in a highly generic sense, broad enough to embrace every inclination to act in obedience to intensive representative feelings of whatever class. These "springs of want. action" are manifold and may be variously classified. The primary conception is that of appetence, and under this are in-, cluded all appetites. Most imperative of all are the desires that conduce to self-sustentation, hunger and thirst. Including with these the other indispensable needs of the body, such as clothing and shelter for man in cold climates, we have a congeries which can be conveniently grouped under the general term Next in degree of essentialness, if it does not hold an equal or higher rank, is that which demands the perpetuation of the species, the sexual appetite, and this, when viewed from the human, social standpoint, clothed with all the secondary attributes which civilization has given it, and refined and spiritualized by the moral elevation of intelligence and culture, becomes expanded into a lofty sentiment and may be characterized by the general term love. To these must be added the social, esthetic, moral, and intellectual cravings, the yearning after the beautiful, the good, and the true. Even this sweeping classification falls far short of conveying an adequate conception of the conative powers, or soul-force in nature. Every emotion belongs to this faculty and helps to swell the vast tide of surging passion that propels the ship of sentient life. All animated nature is burning and seething with intensified desires. On the one hand, we have attractions, charms, allurements, and enchantments; hopes, aspirations, longings; determination, zeal, ambition; and on the other hand we have fear, dread, apprehension; avoidance, aversion, abhorrence; disgust, hate, envy; rivalry, jealousy, anger; rage, fury, and despair. In another direction are seen grief, sorrow, sadness, repentance and remorse, as the expressions of the unattained, misdirected, or irretrievably lost. Even satiety, surfeit, tedium, and ennui become intolerable demands for the exercise of normal physical functions. So widely varying, complex, and recondite are these affective phenomena of mind that it is not surprising that their common bond of union should have been usually lost sight of, and the |