may be exceedingly distinct and vivid is manifest from this, that a painter can copy from them very exact pictures, both in outline and colouring, of the original object; that a musician can perform pieces of music from memory; a cook and a perfumer can mix up ingredients so as to reproduce savours and odours, with much exactness, from the memory of sensations which they have experienced.

Although sensations when recalled by memory are less strong and vivid than they were originally, yet, with that exception, they are recalled as they were experienced, both with their distinctive characters from other sensations, and the pleasure or pain which originally belonged to them. Thus, if the sensation caused by a bright light be accompanied with pain, in remembering the bright light the pain will be remembered also. A child on whom a painful operation has been performed, instantly shrieks and weeps at the sight of the surgeon who performed the operation, or at the sight of his instrument, or at the sight of any person who reminds him of the surgeon, or of any implement that reminds him of his instrument. The whole operation is thus clearly in his mind, and he dreads the repetition of it. A child that has taken a nauseous medicine will sometimes be so vividly reminded of the taste of it by seeing a second dose of it poured out for him, as to have his stomach excited even to vomiting. It has been supposed that in such cases the effect is produced chiefly by the hope or the dread of a repetition of the sensation. But although, doubtless, that element will render the remembrance more vivid, chiefly by fixing the attention more intently and permanently upon it: yet we are satisfied that the prospect of the repetition of the sensation is not the only, nor even the chief cause of the effect sometimes produced by the remembrance of sensations. We have known persons, after having been sick at sea and on shore themselves,

have the squeamishness and nausea revived by merely seeing a vessel rolling and pitching in a heavy sea, and even by looking at the motion of the waves. We know a person who cannot read, or hear of others ascending great heights, as the masts of ships, or precipices, or lofty mountains, without having his nervous system so painfully excited, as sometimes to cover him with perspiration. On the other hand, how often does the mere sight of an instrument of music used in dancing excite gaiety and merriment, even in persons whose dancing days are over; and how often does the mere sight, or smell, or the remembrance of any kind of savoury food excite the nerves of the palate, so as to fill the mouth with saliva. These, and numberless similar phenomena indicate that when past sensations are recalled or suggested, the pleasure or the pain which they originally excited is strongly revived in the remembrance of them.

Still farther, sensations may be recalled not only by the actual repetition of similar sensations, but one remembrance of a sensation may recal another, and that a third, and so on in endless succession. The first one or two notes of a tune heard or remembered may recal one after another all the following notes of the tune, in the succession in which they were originally heard. That tune remembered may recal other tunes, or it may recal some sensation, some sight or feeling, that accompanied it when it was first heard; and any of these remembered sensations may recal others in infinite variety and with wonderful rapidity.

There seem to be considerable diversities in different minds relative to their aptitude for recalling sensations. Some minds seem more readily to have the sensations of one sense recalled, and other minds the sensations of another sense. One has more facility for remembering tacts, another smells, another sounds, and another sights. This may arise from the mind or the organs of sense being so varied in their constitution or condition,

that one mind receives more pleasure or suffers more pain from one class of sensations, and another mind from another class. Whether this diversity is caused, or, at least, indicated by differences in the formation of the brain, as phrenologists believe, is perhaps not yet determined on either side by physiologists. If there be good foundation for the phrenological theory, here may be the germ of it. But whatever may be the cause of this diversity of constitution, or condition, of different minds, there can be no doubt of its existence; and here we may have the embryo of the gourmand, the perfumer, the musician, the painter, and the statuary.

There is another diversity regarding the recalling or remembering of past sensations in different minds, which produces important effects on the character and happiness of different individuals, namely, that in some minds pleasant sensations are most easily and frequently recalled, and in others painful sensations. In some persons not only will pleasant sensations easily recal pleasant sensations, but even painful sensations will recal pleasant sensations: while in others, not only will painful sensations recal former painful sensations, but even pleasant sensations will recal painful ones. The former of these states of mind naturally produces habitual cheerfulness, the latter habitual melancholy. Whether this diversity originates in the structure of the brain, we must again leave to the investigation of physiologists. It cannot, however, we believe, be denied, that the one or the other of these characters of mind is much influenced, if not produced, by the general state of the body in regard to health or sickness, by education, by society, by occupations, by habit, and other similar causes.

But, leaving these way-side observatians, we proceed to remark further, that the more frequently any two or more sensations, or remembered sensations, occupy the mind in immediate succession, the more certainly and the more instantaneously will the one recal the other,

especially the first recal the second and following. Of this we have a familiar example in learning a tune. On first hearing it, we may be able to repeat scarcely two successive sounds of it; but after hearing it, and attending to it repeatedly, the hearing of the first two or three sounds of it will recal all the others in regular succession; and so rapid and so certain may the suggestions become, that every sound will present itself as promptly as the most expert musician can express it by his voice, or by any instrument of which he may have made himself master. And so indelibly may the train of suggestions he fixed in the mind, that from childhood till the close of a long life may a few successive sounds of the tune recal the whole. In this phenomenon we have the germ of the facility acquired by habit in all operations, whether more apparently mental, or whether they be what are usually called-but, we believe most erroneously called-mechanical.

It is a most important fact in regard to this faculty of memory, that the will has no control over it. The mind cannot by any effort deprive itself of its aptitude for remembering its sensations. It cannot change or modify any sensation, or succession of sensations, in remembering it. Such as it was originally, but more faintly, it will, if recalled by any of the laws of suggestion, recur to it again. It cannot forget any sensation, that is, it cannot deprive itself of its aptitude for having any sensation recalled by the operation of the laws of suggestion. It is as passive in this respect as a daguerreotype plate is in receiving and retaining the images of the objects that are placed before it. Situated as we have supposed it to be, without power to move any muscle of the body, both its original sensations and its suggestions would take place, without any choice or any control over them. It is true, as we have seen, the suggestions would be regulated by the degree of attention paid to the original sensation. But we have also seen that that degree of

attention itself would be regulated from without, and not from within the mind. Attention to any sensation would be excited by its own qualities or concomitants, as its intensity or novelty, or any circumstance exciting desire for the continuance or repetition of it; or even any circumstance exciting a desire to avoid the remembrance of it. For so entirely passive is the mind with regard to its remembrances, that the very desire to forget any sensation would have the effect of recalling it.

Another important fact relative to sensations and suggestions, or remembrances of them, is that, so far as we have proceeded in our investigation of facts, we have found nothing that could give rise to the notion of cause and effect in the mind. It has yet no conception of external objects causing sensations, and therefore could never derive any notion of cause and effect from that source. The only real cause and effect with which it is acquainted is an original sensation being the cause, in a certain sense, of the remembrance of it, since without the original sensation there could be no recal of it. But the remembrance is not called up by the original sensation, which is past and gone for ever, but by other sensations, and other suggestions, which other suggestions do not always recal the same remembrance, but any one out of a multitude; so that the fact of sensations or suggestions being followed by various remembrances, would convey to it no notion but of an uncertain succession. Or if the succession were more constant, as in our supposition of the sound of a drum regularly heard before daybreak, or the sound of a bell before nightfall, it never could infer from the succession that the sound of the drum was the cause of day, or the sound of the bell the cause of night. Or, although the sensation of light and heat should be continually experienced together, or immediately following one another, the mind, so far as we have examined it, could never connect them as cause and effect. Το suppose that it should by