we ufually call the fenfes are probably themfelves far from being the only vehicles of enjoyment, or the whole of our conftitution, which is calculated for the fame purpose. We have many internal sensations of the most agreeable kind, hardly referable to any of the five fenfes. Some phyfiologifts have held, that all fecretion is pleasurable; and that the complacency which in health, without any external, affignable, object to excite it, we derive from life itfelf, is the effect of our fecretions going on well within us. All this may be true: but, if true, what reafon can be affigned for it, except the will of the Creator? It may reasonably be asked, why is any thing a pleasure and I know no answer which can be returned to the question, but that which refers it to appointment. We can give no account whatever of our pleasures in the fimple and original perception; and, even when phyfical fenfations are affumed, we can feldom account for them in the fecondary and complicated shapes, in which they take the name of diverfions. I never yet met with a fportfinan, who could tell me in what the fport confifted; who could refolve it into its principle, and state that prin

ciple. I have been a great follower of fishing myself, and in its chearful folitude have paffed fome of the happieft hours of a fufficiently happy life; but, to this moment, I could never trace out the fource of the pleasure which it afforded me.

The "quantum in rebus inane," whether applied to our amufements, or to our graver pursuits, (to which, in truth, it fometimes equally belongs,) is always an unjuft complaint. Iftrifles engage, and if trifles make us happy, the true reflection fuggefted by the experiment, is upon the tendency of nature to gratification and enjoyment; which is, in other words, the goodness of its author towards his fenfitive

creation.

Rational natures alfo, as fuch, exhibit qualities which help to confirm the truth of our pofition. The degree of understanding found in mankind, is usually much greater than what is neceffary for preservation. The pleasure of choofing for themselves, and of profecuting the object of their choice, fhould feem to be an original fource of enjoyment. The pleafures received from things, great, beautiful, or new, from imitation, or from the liberal arts, are, in fome measure, not only fuperadded,

but

but unmixed gratifications, having no pains to balance them*.

I do not know whether our attachment to property be not fomething more than the mere dictate of reafon, or even than the mere effect of affociation. Property communicates a charm to whatever is the object of it. It is the first of our abstract ideas; it cleaves to us the closest and the longest. It endears to the child its plaything, to the peasant his cottage, to the landholder his eftate. It fupplies the place of prospect and scenery. Inftead of coveting the beauty of distant fituations, it teaches every man to find it in his own. It gives boldness and grandeur to plains and fens, tinge and colouring to clays and fallows.

All these confiderations come in aid of our fecond propofition. The reader will now bear in mind what our two propofitions were. They were, firft; that, in a vaft plurality of inftances, in which contrivance is perceived, the defign of the contrivance is beneficial: fecondly; that the Deity has added pleasure to animal sensations beyond what was necessary for any other purpose; or when the purpose,

* Balguy on the Divine Benevolence.

fo

fo far as it was neceffary, might have been effected by the operation of pain.

Whilst these propofitions can be maintained, we are authorized to afcribe to the Deity the character of benevolence: and what is benevolence at all, muft in him be infinite benevolence, by reafon of the infinite, that is to Lay, the incalculably great, number of objects, upon which it is exercised.

Of the ORIGIN OF EVIL no universal folution has been difcovered: I mean no folution which reaches to all cafes of complaint. The most comprehensive is that which arifes from the confideration of general rules. We may, I think, without much difficulty, be brought to admit the four following points; first, that important advantages may accrue to the universe from the order of nature proceeding according to general laws: fecondly; that general laws, however well fet and constituted, often thwart and cross one another: thirdly; that from these thwartings and croffings frequent particular inconveniences will arife: and fourthly; that it agrees with our observation to suppose, that fome degree of thefe inconveniences takes place in the works of nature, Thefe points

may

On

may be allowed: and it may also be afferted that the general laws with which we are acquainted, are directed to beneficial ends. the other hand, with many of these laws we are not acquainted at all, or we are totally unable to trace them in their branches and in their operation; the effect of which ignorance is, that they cannot be of importance to us as measures by which to regulate our conduct. The confervation of them may be of importance in other respects, or to other beings, but we are uninformed of their value or ufe: confequently when, and how far, they may or may not be suspended, or their effects turned afide, by a prefiding and benevolent will, without incurring greater evils than those which would be avoided. The confideration, therefore, of general laws, although it : may concern the queftion of the origin of evil very nearly, (which I think it does,) refts in views difproportionate to our faculties, and in a knowledge which we do not poffefs. It ferves rather to account for the obfcurity of the fubject, than to fupply us with diftin&t answers to our difficulties. However, whilft we affent to the above stated propofitions as principles, whatever uncertainty we may find in the ap plication, we lay a ground for believing, that

cafes,