 | Oliver J. Thatcher - 2004 - 466 pagina’s
...cause. V. Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the one by means of the other; the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other. VI. A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object. VII. If a thing can be conceived as non-existing,... | |
 | Benedict de Spinoza - 2006 - 465 pagina’s
...cause. V. Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the one by means of the other; the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other. VI. A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object. VII. If a thing can be conceived as non-existing,... | |
 | Richard Mason - 2007 - 252 pagina’s
...'Things which have nothing in common with each other cannot be understood through each other; that is, the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other'. Given a link between causality and 'conceiving through' - if A causes B then B must be conceived through... | |
 | Martin Wurzinger - 2007 - 520 pagina’s
...seen. A V. Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the one by means of the other; the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other. Transl: Again, our schema made this obvious under A II—no DTS, no connection. A VI. A true idea must... | |
 | 1921 - 710 pagina’s
...cannot be comprehended by means of each other; that is, the conception of the one does not involve tie conception of the other. 6. A true idea must agree with its object. 7. If a thing can be conceived as non-existent, it' essence does not involve existence. PROPOSITION... | |
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The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the knowledge of a cause. V. Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the one by means of the other ; the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other. 
