 I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places...  The Spectator - Pagina 79geredigeerd door - 1898Volledige weergave - Over dit boek
 | Thomas Curtis - 1829 - 816 pagina’s
...the sick, congratulates the sound. And holds for thrice three days a royal feast. Id. Л r«ri«i is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as it^lf, the same thinking thing in different times and Й»ОД. Loche. If speaking of himself in the... | |
 | Joseph Addison - 1837 - 478 pagina’s
...world to endeavour at settling what it was that might be said to compose personal identity. Mr. Locke, after having premised that the word person properly...identity of sameness» ' Had I the same consciousness,' savs that author, «that I saw the ark and Noah'» flood, as that I saw an overflowing of the Thames... | |
 | Thomas Brown, David Welsh - 1846 - 580 pagina’s
..." wherein personal identity consists, we must consider what person stands for ; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places, which it does only by that consciousness which... | |
 | The Phrenological Journal and Magazine of Moral Science from the year 1846 VOL.XIX - 1846 - 416 pagina’s
...faculties do not enable us to ascertain), but, in accordance with Locke's definition of a person, " a thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places." In this sense of the word, our faculties enable... | |
 | Thomas Brown, James Parkinson Boyle - 1849 - 370 pagina’s
...consequences of either of the two. This was the source of Locke's paradox ; from his definition of person — a thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself, as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places, which it only does by that consciousness which... | |
 | John Locke - 1849 - 588 pagina’s
...wherein personal identity consists, we must consider what " person" stands for ; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different tunes and places ; which it does only by that consciousness which... | |
 | Theophilus - 1850 - 380 pagina’s
...of the Greeks. Emmons used the term person substantially as does Locke, when he defines person as " a thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing at different times and places."* That Emmons does, in fact, harmonize with... | |
 | JOHN MURRAY - 1852 - 786 pagina’s
...consists, we must consider what person stands for; OF IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY. 171 which, I think, is—a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places—which it does only by that Consciousness which... | |
 | Spectator The - 1853 - 554 pagina’s
...world to endeavour at settling what it was that might be said to compose personal identity. Mr. Locke, after having premised that the word person properly...concludes, that it is consciousness alone, and not identity of substance, which makes this personal identity of sameness. 'Had I the same consciousness... | |
 | 1853 - 604 pagina’s
...world to endeavour at settling what it was that might be said to compose personal identity. Mr. Locke, after having premised that the word person properly...concludes, that it is consciousness alone, and not identity of substance, which makes this personal identity of sameness. 'Had I the same consciousness... | |
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