The British Army and Jewish Insurgency in Palestine, 1945-47
Springer, 12 jun. 1989 - 267 pagina's
The first comprehensive scholarly study of the British Army's campaign against the Jewish insurgency in postwar Palestine, this book shows how outdated doctrine, traditional resistance to change, and postwar turbulence hampered the army's efforts to modify its counter-insurgency tactics. It also shows why the security forces failed to develop intelligence sufficient to defeat the insurgents.
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The Political Setting
The Insurgent Challenge
Assessing the Political Impact
The British Response to
d Intelligence Services
Some Reasons Why
Overige edities - Alles weergeven
1st Infantry Division 2nd Parachute Brigade 3rd Parachute Brigade action administration American April Arab arms army's arrested attack August Aviv Battalion Bethell Bevin bombing Briance Britain British army British government Bullock Cabinet campaign casualties Cohen Colonial Office command Committee conflict counter-insurgency Creech-Jones Cunningham Papers damage detained effective February Foreign Office Hadera Haganah Haifa High Commissioner HQ Palestine Ibid illegal immigration incidents insurgent propaganda insurgents intelligence internal security interview with author Irgun January Jerusalem Jewish Agency Jews July June Lechi legitimacy London Lydda Mandate March martial law Middle East Forces military Montgomery Nathanya November October Operation AGATHA organisation Palestine government Palestine Police Palmach patrols political Press problem propaganda Pyman Diaries railway resistance movement responsibility role search operations security forces security operations soldiers strategy T. E. Lawrence tactical Telegram terrorism terrorist troops Tugwell United vehicle blown violence White Paper Yishuv Zionist Zionist movement