The British Army and Jewish Insurgency in Palestine, 1945-47

Voorkant
Springer, 12 jun 1989 - 267 pagina's
The first comprehensive scholarly study of the British Army's campaign against the Jewish insurgency in postwar Palestine, this book shows how outdated doctrine, traditional resistance to change, and postwar turbulence hampered the army's efforts to modify its counter-insurgency tactics. It also shows why the security forces failed to develop intelligence sufficient to defeat the insurgents.
 

Inhoudsopgave

The Political Setting
12
The United States and the Palestine
26
The Insurgent Challenge
51
Assessing the Political Impact
77
The British Response to
84
Some Reasons Why
132
Palestine and the British Experience of CounterInsurgency
169
Insurgent Organisation Charts
177
Security Forces Operations
198
The Cost of the Insurgency
205
Bibliography
246
Index
258
Copyright

Overige edities - Alles bekijken

Veelvoorkomende woorden en zinsdelen

Bibliografische gegevens