 | Oliver Joseph Thatcher - 1907 - 484 pagina’s
...cause. V. Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the one by means of the other; the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other. VI. A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object. VII. If a thing can be conceived as non-existing,... | |
 | 1908 - 768 pagina’s
...cause. V. Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the one by means of the other; the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other. VI. A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object. VII. If a thing can be conceived as non-existing,... | |
 | Benjamin Rand - 1909 - 832 pagina’s
...cause. V. Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, .the'0ne by means of the other ; the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other. VI. A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object. VII. If a thing can be conceived as non-existing,... | |
 | John Elof Boodin - 1911 - 362 pagina’s
...axiom that "things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the one by means of the other ; the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other " — meaning by " in common " merely that the things must be capable of making a difference to each... | |
 | Karl W. Benzing - 1997 - 356 pagina’s
...cause. 5. Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the one by means of the other; the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other. 6. A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object. 7. If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, its essence does... | |
 | P.J. Bagley - 1999 - 312 pagina’s
..."Things which have nothing in common with each other cannot be understood through each other; that is, the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other." Given a link between causality and "conceiving through" — if A causes B then B must be conceived... | |
 | Roger Ariew, Eric Watkins - 2000 - 326 pagina’s
...nothing in common with each other cannot be understood through each other; that is, the conception of the one does not involve the conception of the other. 6. A true idea must agree with that of which it is the idea [ideatum]. 7. If a thing can be conceived as not existing, its essence... | |
 | David M. Rosenthal - 2000 - 336 pagina’s
...Def. 3. For each substance must be in itself and must be conceived through itself, that is to say, the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other. — QED PROPOSITION III. // two things have nothing in common with one another, one cannot be the cause... | |
 | Benedictus de Spinoza - 2001 - 394 pagina’s
...one another cannot through one another be mutually understood, that is to say, the conception of the one does not involve the conception of the other. 6. A true idea must agree with that of which it is the idea (cum suo ideato) . 7. The essence of that thing which can be conceived... | |
 | John Elof Boodin - 2001 - 406 pagina’s
...axiom that "things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the one by means of the other ; the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other " — meaning by " in common " merely that the things must be capable of making a difference to each... | |
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The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the knowledge of a cause. V. Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the one by means of the other ; the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other. 
